Previous research has failed to provide consistent results on the relationship between ownership-control disparity and earnings management. This paper tried to clarify the relationship between ownership-control disparity and earnings management through auditor independence, which can affect manager 's profit adjustment. The purpose of this study is to verify the relationship between ownership-control disparity and earnings management, with how this relationship is moderated by auditor economic incentives. This study used multiple regression models to verify the interaction between ownership-control disparity and auditor independence on managerial earningsmanagement. The results of this study show that there is a significant and negative relationship between ownership-control disparity and earnings management, and this relationship is reinforced by auditor economic incentives. Therefore, it seems that ownership-control disparity serves as a catalyst for suppressing opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders and managers by triggering surveillance activities of external stakeholders. This result can be evidence that ownership-control disparity supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. In addition, these results were confirmed only in firms belonging to holding groups, with the high ratio of outside directors, and a high-quality auditor, and thereby increase the validity of the results. This study is expected to contribute to the rational decision making of stakeholders by providing newevidence on ownership-control disparity that has only been perceived negatively.